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I. INTRODUCTION 
Milton Cohen, in his seminal article, “Truth in Securities” Revisit-
ed,1 was the first to highlight the awkwardness created by the enactment 
of the Securities Act of 19332 before the enactment of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.3 Cohen pointed out that if the Securities Act, which 
regulates public offerings of securities, had been adopted subsequent to 
or simultaneously with the Exchange Act, which regulates the disclosure 
obligations of public companies, then public-offering disclosure obliga-
tions would naturally piggyback on the periodic disclosure obligations 
mandated for public companies.4 Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s political 
calculation, however, ensured that the bills would be separate and that 
the Exchange Act would come second.5 That accident of history meant 
that the two statutes would develop separate disclosure obligations. That 
separate development ignored the economic reality that investors would 
seek largely the same information in valuing securities, regardless of 
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whether they were purchasing from an issuer in a primary transaction or 
another investor in a secondary transaction. 
Companies’ public-offering and secondary-market disclosure obli-
gations have gradually converged since Cohen wrote in the 1960s. The 
rise of integrated disclosure obligations for the two Acts in the 1980s6 is 
generally considered a way station along the path to full-blown company 
registration.7 Company registration would allow a company to register as 
a public company just once; thereafter, the company could offer and sell 
securities whenever it wanted, without the need to register the securities 
themselves.8 The move toward company registration began with shelf 
registration under Rule 415,9 which allows for considerable incorporation 
by reference of prior public disclosure in registration statements for of-
ferings by public companies. That movement culminated in the SEC’s 
2005 offering reforms, which streamlined shelf registration.10 Now, the 
largest public issuers operate under the functional equivalent of company 
registration. The advantages of company registration are available, how-
ever, only for a subset of the companies that have previously transitioned 
from private- to public-company status. Initial public offerings (IPOs), 
the customary path for attaining public-company status, are not included 
in shelf registration. Instead, IPOs are still subject to the traditional regu-
latory regime, with its “gun-jumping” restrictions on voluntary disclo-
sures and offers made before the SEC’s approval of a company’s regis-
tration statement. The gun-jumping rules are intended to quell specula-
tive fervor by forcing disclosure into the SEC’s mandatory format. 
The separate enactment of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act 
also influenced the development of the distinction between public and 
private under those two statutes. Both the Securities Act and the Ex-
change Act reflect a public–private divide, but they take very different 
approaches to drawing that line. The Securities Act draws the line be-
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tween public and private in a manner that focuses explicitly on investor 
protection. The dividing line under the Exchange Act, by contrast, is a 
compromise—reflecting not only investor protection, but also interests in 
capital formation and practical ease of application. I argue here that the 
resulting mismatch between the public–private dividing lines under the 
two Acts means that the transition from private to public will inevitably 
be awkward, abrupt, and fraught with problems for issuers, investors, and 
regulators. Can we reconcile the two dividing lines so that companies can 
navigate this passage from private to public more smoothly? 
Congress has partially addressed this problem with its recent adop-
tion of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act). Unhappy 
with the SEC’s somewhat tepid efforts to facilitate capital raising by 
smaller companies, Congress gave the SEC new authority to exempt of-
ferings from the requirements for registered offerings. Along with that 
exemptive authority, Congress authorized the SEC to adopt less demand-
ing periodic disclosure requirements for companies who avail themselves 
of this new offering exemption. These disclosure requirements would 
presumably only apply until a company triggered the standards for full-
fledged public-company status. Those public-company standards are also 
newly raised by the JOBS Act. The JOBS Act reforms have the potential 
to create a lower tier of public companies, thus blurring the line between 
public and private. Advocates for investor protection have roundly criti-
cized these changes, asserting that it opens the door for fraud and manip-
ulation.11 Such criticisms carry some weight, given the abuses that re-
peatedly occur in the penny stock market. 
My thesis is that the transition between private- and public-
company status could be less bumpy if we unify the public–private divid-
ing line under the Securities Act and Exchange Act. The insight builds 
on Cohen’s thought experiment where Congress first enacted the Ex-
change Act. My proposed public–private standard would take the com-
pany-registration model to its logical conclusion. The customary path to 
public-company status is through an IPO, typically with simultaneous 
listing of the shares on an exchange. There is nothing about public offer-
ings, however, that makes them inherently antecedent to public-company 
status. What if companies became public, with required periodic disclo-
sures to a secondary market, before they were allowed to make public 
offerings? 
                                                                  
 11. Andrew Ackerman, Scrap Over Easing IPO Rules, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2012, at C3 
(“Former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt called it ‘the most investor-
unfriendly bill that I have experienced in the past two decades.’”). 
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I propose a two-tier market for both primary and secondary transac-
tions keyed to investor sophistication. The private market would be lim-
ited to accredited investors, while the public market would be accessible 
to all. An easily measured quantitative benchmark—market capitaliza-
tion or trading volume—would trigger the transition between public and 
private markets, allowing companies to elect public status after reaching 
that threshold. Once a company opts for public status, that newly public 
company would have a seasoning period during which periodic disclo-
sures would be required. Only after the seasoning period could newly 
minted public companies sell shares to the public at large. Such a regime 
would substantially enhance the information available to the primary 
market once a company makes a public offering. More importantly, it 
would allow the secondary market to process that information before any 
public offerings. This regulatory framework would go a long way toward 
both promoting efficient capital formation and eliminating the waste cur-
rently associated with IPOs. A happy byproduct would be more vigorous 
protection for unsophisticated investors. 
I proceed as follows. Part II outlines the current public–private di-
viding lines under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. This part 
also explores Facebook’s recent transition from private to public status 
under that framework, as well as Congress’s recent intervention in the 
field with the JOBS Act. Part III explores the problems of making the 
transition from private to public, focusing on IPOs and their role in capi-
tal allocation. This part uses Facebook’s IPO as both an illustration and 
as a cautionary tale. Part IV sketches an alternative to the current regula-
tory framework based on the two-tier-market proposal summarized 
above. Part V concludes. 
II. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE 
The distinction between public and private companies is an im-
portant triggering mechanism under both the Securities Act and the Ex-
change Act. As noted above, the two statutes’ differing demarcations 
between public and private date back to their original enactment during 
the New Deal. Common to both are the significant regulatory conse-
quences that flow from public designation. Consequently, companies and 
their lawyers spend considerable energy avoiding public status. This reg-
ulatory arbitrage has induced the SEC to spend like effort in curtailing 
those attempted evasions of public status. The SEC has erected fences 
around private companies and private offerings that result in markets 
facing an informational void when a company is ready to make the tran-
sition from private to public. Facebook’s recent IPO and preceding de-
velopments illustrate the problems created by the transition. Those de-
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velopments helped spark the tweaks that Congress made to the public–
private dividing line in the JOBS Act. 
A. The Public Trigger 
1. The Securities Act 
Under the Securities Act, public offerings are open to any and all 
comers. Accordingly, public offerings are subject not only to extensive 
disclosure requirements, but also to a byzantine array of gun-jumping 
rules limiting voluntary disclosure intended to curb speculative frenzies 
for newly issued securities.12 Private offerings are exempt from registra-
tion and the gun-jumping rules under § 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act. The 
Supreme Court has interpreted § 4(a)(2) in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.13 
as permitting private offerings only to investors who can “fend for them-
selves,” and therefore do not need the protections afforded by registra-
tion under the Securities Act. Because they are limited to sophisticated 
investors, private offerings are subject to considerably less onerous dis-
closure requirements than public offerings.14 But private offerings are 
subject to a number of procedures designed to prevent end runs around 
the public-offering process—in other words, nominally private offerings 
that are funneled through intermediaries to the public at large: “distribu-
tions.”15 
The SEC has provided a safe harbor for § 4(a)(2) under Rule 506 of 
Regulation D.16 Rule 506 offerings are limited to investors with the req-
uisite sophistication to evaluate the investment.17  This requirement is 
diluted somewhat, however, by Regulation D’s conclusive presumption 
that accredited investors, which include individuals with annual income 
of $200,000 or assets of $1 million, are deemed to have the requisite in-
vestment sophistication.18 This presumption, although somewhat difficult 
to square with Ralston Purina (and reality, for that matter), encourages 
many companies to limit their offerings to accredited investors exclu-
sively. The regulatory presumption is that wealthy investors are capable 
of assessing the merits of an investment on their own, without the disclo-
                                                                  
 12. Those rules are accompanied by an equally byzantine array of exemptions to make the 
whole scheme viable, if expensive. For a comprehensive summary, see STEPHEN J. CHOI & A. C. 
PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 404–51 (3d ed. 2011). 
 13. 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). 
 14. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2012). 
 15. See United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 16. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2012). 
 17. Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). 
 18. Id. §§ 230.501(a)(5)–(6). 
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sure mandated pursuant to the Securities Act. Market demands, however, 
dictate that some disclosure, comparable to the core mandatory disclo-
sure requirements, will be forthcoming. Query how accurate that disclo-
sure will be without the sanction of the Securities Act’s liability provi-
sions. 
2. The Exchange Act 
The Exchange Act also has a public–private dividing line, but it is 
framed very differently than the Securities Act. The Exchange Act’s his-
tory has shaped its dividing line. When the Securities Exchange Act was 
enacted in 1934, there were two types of trading venues: stock exchang-
es—the New York Stock Exchange being the most dominant—and the 
over-the-counter (OTC) market. 
At first, Congress chose to require disclosure only from exchange-
listed companies.19 In 1936, Congress added companies making a public 
offering to the list of public companies; periodic disclosures would be 
required after the IPO.20 Both of these categories could be avoided; issu-
ers that did not list on an exchange and did not make a public offering 
would not be burdened by disclosure requirements, albeit at the cost of 
less liquidity and less access to capital. It was not until 1964 that Con-
gress added companies trading in the OTC market to the list, 21 closing a 
loophole long disliked by both the SEC and the exchanges.22 Even then, 
not all OTC companies were brought within the rubric of public status; 
only companies with 500 or more “record” shareholders that were also 
above a certain minimum asset size (currently set at $10 million) were 
included.23 Smaller companies, for which the opportunities for fraud and 
manipulation were most prevalent, remained largely unregulated. If any-
thing, the 500-shareholder limit disguised the substantial space left for 
smaller companies to remain private. The 500 number tallied record 
ownership rather than beneficial ownership. So, if broker-dealers held 
the shares on the company’s record books as nominees for their custom-
ers, companies could have thousands of beneficial owners hidden be-
neath a record shareholder number that remained under 500. 
Why the numerical trigger? Joel Seligman suggests the number re-
flects a political compromise, with Congress splitting the difference be-
                                                                  
 19. Pub. L. No. 73-404, § 12(a)-(b), 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a)-(b) 
(2012)). 
 20. Pub. L. No. 75-462, § 3, 49 Stat. 1375 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2012)). 
 21. Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 3(c), 78 Stat. 565 (1964) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2012)). 
 22. SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 312.  
 23. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1. 
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tween the regulators and the securities industry.24 The numerical criterion 
has a certain logic. Investor protection may be more important for larger 
companies because they have more investors, but capital formation for 
larger companies is potentially more significant. Bigger companies, be-
cause of the wider scope of their operations, might have greater influence 
on the efficiency of capital allocation in the overall economy. 25  (Of 
course, smaller companies might be more significant to capital formation 
at the margin because they have greater potential for growth.) Whatever 
the motivation, the numerical trigger adopted in 1964 extended the earli-
er pattern of forcing disclosure from companies “presumed to be the sub-
ject of active investor interest.”26 The 1964 Act excluded companies with 
fewer investors for reasons of “practicality,” despite the SEC’s recom-
mendation of a broader reach in its Special Study of the Securities Mar-
kets.27 Giving the SEC the greater regulatory reach that it sought would 
have maximized investor protection. Even while greatly expanding the 
scope of regulation, however, politicians were concerned by the negative 
effects that might arise if small companies were roped into the burdens of 
public-company status. Investor protection would have to be balanced 
against the need to foster capital formation. 
Notably absent from these criteria for public-company status under 
the Exchange Act was any consideration of the character of the investors. 
The Act treated sophisticated institutions and small retail investors alike 
for purposes of the tally to 500 that triggered public-company status. Is-
suers could not avoid public-company status by limiting their investor 
base to accredited investors. Such a limitation could be achieved through 
the imposition of transfer restrictions by the issuer, but it would not 
avoid public status if the 500-shareholder limit was passed. Regardless of 
the sophistication of those 500 investors, the company had no choice but 
to comply with the periodic disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act 
upon reaching the threshold. 
B. Facebook 
Facebook’s recent transition from a private company to a public 
one illustrates the problems created by the differing private–public divid-
                                                                  
 24. SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 315. 
 25. See, e.g., Gil Sadka, The Economic Consequences of Accounting Fraud in Product Mar-
kets: Theory and a Case from the U.S. Telecommunications Industry (WorldCom), 8 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 439 (2006) (demonstrating market distortions created by massive fraud at WorldCom). 
 26. Cohen, supra note 1, at 1341. 
 27. Id. at 1368. The SEC’s recommendation is found in REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF 
SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt.3, 
at 62–64 (1963). 
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ing lines under the two Acts. The Exchange Act’s numerical trigger for 
public-company status recently emerged from technical obscurity as Fa-
cebook inched toward becoming a public company. In late 2010, Gold-
man Sachs proposed selling a significant block of Facebook shares.28 The 
transaction drew attention because Facebook, at that time, was a private 
company, and it was planning to maintain that status. Goldman planned 
to preserve Facebook’s private status by selling the company’s shares to 
institutional and other sophisticated investors via a trust that would bun-
dle their interests into a single investment vehicle.29 The bundling was 
the unusual feature of the transaction. It was designed to keep the num-
ber of record Facebook investors under the 500-shareholder filing 
threshold of the Exchange Act.30 
Whether this bundling approach was a viable strategy is open to 
debate. Rule 12g5-1(a) of the Exchange Act allows shares held of record 
by a legal entity to count as one person. Rule 12g5-1(b), however, stipu-
lates that “[i]f the issuer knows or has reason to know that the form of 
holding securities of record is used primarily to circumvent” the filing 
requirement, “the beneficial owners of such securities shall be deemed to 
be the record owners thereof.” In other words, subsection (b) suggests 
that the SEC would look past the legal entity to the actual owners, if the 
issuer knows that the entity is being used to avoid public-company filing. 
The proposed transaction attracted considerable media attention, 
which led to the offering’s eventual demise. Concerns that the media at-
tention looked like a “general solicitation,” which would cause the offer 
to become “public” and conflict with the Securities Act of 1933, killed 
the deal.31 Goldman instead placed the shares in an offshore transac-
tion.32 Subsequently, Facebook has transitioned to a public company; its 
initial public offering is discussed in detail below. 33 
                                                                  
 28. Evan Weinberger, Goldman’s Facebook Stake May Force SEC’s Hand¸ LAW 360 (Jan. 4, 
2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/217826/goldman-s-facebook-stake-may-force-sec-
s-hand. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Facebook’s assets were already well in excess of $10 million. See Kevin Kelleher, Face-
book is Worth $52 Billion, and That’s Not a Good Thing, REUTERS (Dec. 13, 2010), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/mediafile/2010/12/14/facebook-is-worth-52-billion-and-thats-not-a-good-
thing/. 
 31. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2012) (prohibiting general solicitations in connection with private 
placements under Rule 506). 
 32. Liz Rappaport, Aaron Lucchetti & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Goldman Limits Facebook Offer-
ing, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487033966 
04576087941210274036.html (“Goldman Sachs Group Inc. slammed the door on U.S. clients hop-
ing to invest in a private offering of shares in Facebook Inc., because it said the intense media spot-
light left the deal in danger of violating U.S. securities laws.”). 
 33. See infra text accompanying notes 74–83. 
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Facebook’s interaction with the private–public divide was also 
highlighted in another story that surfaced around the same time. Word 
leaked that the SEC was investigating secondary trading markets for vio-
lations relating to the resale of securities issued by private companies.34 
Facebook was among the more notable companies traded on one of these 
venues, SecondMarket. 
These markets cater mainly to current and former employees of pri-
vate companies, but also to some early-round investors. They have expe-
rienced strong growth in recent years. According to the New York Times, 
“[i]n 2009, SecondMarket completed $100 million worth of transactions 
in private shares. Last year, its volume was nearly six times that amount, 
with Facebook trades making up the bulk. Its rival SharesPost logged 
$625 million in transactions last year, more than double its total from 
2010.”35 The SEC’s investigation threatened this growth. 
The SEC later announced that it had reached a settlement of an en-
forcement action with SharesPost. The agency’s complaint alleged that 
the trading venue had been operating as an unlicensed broker-dealer.36 At 
the same time, the SEC announced an enforcement action against Felix 
Investments. The SEC’s complaint alleged that Felix took secret com-
missions from the sellers of private shares, in addition to the fees paid by 
purchasers. The agency also alleged that Felix had misled investors in 
connection with the sale of Facebook shares. The SharesPost enforce-
ment action is a mere regulatory violation; the Felix action, however, is a 
reminder of the vulnerability of thinly traded markets to manipulation.37 
Despite the growth of private markets, these trading venues are still 
dwarfed by the trading of public-company shares on registered exchang-
es. The current structure of these private markets substantially limits 
their trade volume. SecondMarket and similar venues do not provide the 
liquidity afforded by an exchange, as they lack specialists and market 
                                                                  
 34. Peter Lattman, Stock Trading in Private Companies Draws S.E.C. Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Dec. 27, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/27/stock-trading-in-private-
companies-draws-scrutiny/. 
 35. Evelyn M. Rusli & Peter Lattman, Losing a Goose That Laid the Golden Egg, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Feb. 2, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/02/losing-the-goose-that-laid-the-
golden-egg/. 
 36. Evelyn M. Rusli, Charges Filed Against Brokerage Firms That Trade Private Shares¸ N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 14, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/charges-filed-against-
brokerage-firms-that-trade-private-shares/. 
 37. Facebook’s initial registration statement for its IPO disclosed that it had been contacted by 
SEC staff in connection with its investigation into alternative trading venues. Alison Frankel, What 
Everyone Missed in Facebook’s IPO Filing, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2012), http://in.reuters.com/article/ 
2012/02/03/frankel-facebook-idINDEE81205H20120203. No enforcement action, however, was 
filed against Facebook. 
1008 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:999 
makers. Instead, they provide the more limited liquidity service of 
matching buyers and sellers in a central, virtual location.38 These trading 
venues are limited to accredited investors, and the venues screen pro-
spective investors to ensure that they qualify as accredited.39 These pre-
cautions help ensure that the shares are not being “distributed” to the 
public, which could render the trading venue an underwriter for purposes 
of the Securities Act.40 The Exchange Act’s numerical shareholder limit 
for private companies is an additional obstacle to private-market growth. 
Notwithstanding these limitations under current regulation, the growth of 
these venues suggests clear potential for expansion if the regulatory 
scheme would accommodate it. The SEC’s investigation, however, casts 
a shadow over the future of private markets. 
C. The JOBS Act 
The fallout from Goldman’s failed private offering of Facebook 
shares triggered a rather dramatic legislative response. Congress seized 
upon the salient occasion to attack the SEC for blocking capital for-
mation.41 The SEC responded in timeworn fashion, promising a review 
of its regulations to assess their effect on U.S. capital markets.42 But the 
SEC’s delay tactic failed; the Republican House of Representatives saw a 
wedge issue that could make the Democrats look bad in an election year 
and pushed forward with legislation. That bill would ultimately become 
the JOBS Act. President Barack Obama, anxious to portray himself as 
“pro-growth,” while facing an economy still plagued by high levels of 
                                                                  
 38. Richard Teitelbaum, Facebook Drives SecondMarket Broking $1 Billion Private Shares, 
BLOOMBERG MARKETS MAG. (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-
27/facebook-drives-secondmarket-broking-1-billion-private-shares.html. 
 39. Id.  
 40. See Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959) (interpreting the definition of 
an “underwriter” in § 2(a)(11) of the Securities Act). 
 41. Letter from Rep. Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Oversight Committee, to Mary Schapiro, 
Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 22, 2011), available at http://www.knowledgemosaic.com/ 
resourcecenter/Issa.041211.pdf. 
 42. Letter from Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Rep. Darrell Issa, Chair-
man, House Oversight Committee (Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/ 
schapiro-issa-letter-040611.pdf. 
2013] Revisiting “‘Truth in Securities’ Revisited” 1009 
unemployment, signed the JOBS Act into law.43 The SEC’s opposition to 
the bill44 carried little weight in the face of those electoral imperatives. 
1. Exchange Act Reforms 
The JOBS Act makes it easier to remain a private company. The 
500-shareholder limit for triggering public-company status under the Ex-
change Act is now gone. The JOBS Act raises that number to 500 per-
sons who are not accredited investors, and more critically, 2,000 inves-
tors overall.45 Excluded from both numbers are shareholders who re-
ceived the securities through an employee compensation plan exempted 
from registration.46 This latter provision promises to delay the point at 
which a growing company would be forced to make the periodic disclo-
sures required of public companies. I question whether this is an im-
portant constraint for companies smaller than Facebook that are striving 
to maintain their private status. Data on this issue are simply not availa-
ble. 
A key goal of the JOBS Act was to jump-start the market for IPOs 
by easing the burden of public-company status on newly public compa-
nies. The JOBS Act eliminated a substantial expense for post-IPO com-
panies by exempting them from § 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which 
required auditor assessment of a company’s internal controls. 47  The 
JOBS Act also reduced the audited-financial-statement requirement for 
IPOs to only two years.48 These regulatory relaxations last for five years 
from a company’s IPO or until the company reaches $1 billion in annual 
revenue, whichever is sooner.49 
                                                                  
 43. Jonathan Weisman, Final Approval by House Sends Jobs Bill to President for Signature, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/us/politics/final-approval-by-
house-sends-jobs-bill-to-president-for-signature.html. 
 44. David S. Hilzenrath, Jobs Act Could Remove Investor Protections, SEC Chair Mary 
Schapiro Warns, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ 
jobs-act-could-open-a-door-to-investment-fraud-sec-chief-says/2012/03/14/gIQA1vx1BS_story.html 
(“‘Too often, investors are the target of fraudulent schemes disguised as investment opportunities,’ 
Schapiro wrote. ‘As you know, if the balance is tipped to the point where investors are not confident 
that there are appropriate protections, investors will lose confidence in our markets, and capital 
formation will ultimately be made more difficult and expensive.’”). State securities regulators also 
voiced their opposition. The JOBS Act an Investor Protection Disaster Waiting to Happen, N. AM. 
SEC. ADMINISTRATORS ASS’N (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.nasaa.org/11548/nasaa-the-jobs-act-an-
investor-protection-disaster-waiting-to-happen/. 
 45. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 501, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(A) (2012). 
 46. Id. § 502, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(5)(A). 
 47. Id. § 103, 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b). 
 48. Id. § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 77g(2)(A). 
 49. Id. § 101(a)–(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(19), 78c(a)(80). 
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2. Securities Act Reforms 
The JOBS Act also loosens the gun-jumping rules. The JOBS Act 
authorizes issuers to “test the waters” with qualified institutional buyers 
and accredited investors before filing a registration statement.50 The goal 
is to assess whether there is demand for the company’s shares, allowing 
the company to avoid the expense of the registration process if interest is 
lacking. In addition, the law frees analysts to issue research reports for 
new issuers during the offering process.51 The goal of this provision is to 
promote demand for the company’s shares. The combination of these 
two provisions suggests that Congress sees the gun-jumping rules as 
hopelessly outdated. 
Especially relevant to the Facebook affair, the JOBS Act also tar-
geted the SEC’s ban on general solicitation in private placements. In fact, 
the JOBS Act repealed the prohibition outright.52 Under the JOBS Act, 
the media attention that Goldman’s proposed offering drew would not 
have jeopardized the § 4(a)(2) exemption as long as actual sales were 
made only to accredited investors. 
Another provision of the JOBS Act has the potential to blur the dis-
tinction between private and public in a much more profound way. Con-
gress opened the door for public offerings by smaller companies with 
substantially fewer restrictions. It did so by increasing the SEC’s authori-
ty to exempt offerings from registration under § 5, raising the offering 
limit under § 3(b) tenfold from $5 million to $50 million.53 The gun-
jumping rules are put aside altogether, as companies are allowed to “test 
the waters” prior to filing a registration statement. 54 Moreover, Congress 
also stipulated that the securities sold be unrestricted, meaning they 
could be freely resold to retail investors.55 In a somewhat unusual move, 
Congress mandated the adoption of a new exemption by the SEC pursu-
ant to this authority, perhaps recognizing that the SEC would simply ig-
nore it otherwise. In a concession to investor protection, however, Con-
gress did allow the agency to require periodic disclosures by companies 
that avail themselves of this new exemption.56 It also made offering dis-
                                                                  
 50. Id. § 105(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(d). 
 51. Id. § 105(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2012). 
 52. Id. § 201(a)(1) (codified at § 4(b) of the Securities Act). Congress also authorized an ex-
emption for “crowd-funding.” Id. §§ 301–05, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 77d-1, 78l(g), 78c, 77r, 78o. 
 53. Id. § 401(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2). 
 54. Id. § 401(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(E). 
 55. Id. § 401(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(B). 
 56. Id. § 401(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(4). 
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closures subject to § 12(a)(2) liability under the Securities Act, but not, 
conspicuously, § 11’s strict liability regime.57 
3. Implications for the Private–Public Dividing Line 
At first glance, the JOBS Act is a direct shot across the SEC’s bow, 
moving the line between public and private markets to afford private 
markets considerably more space. For the SEC, preservation of public 
markets—populated by a sizable contingent of retail investors (voters)—
is an existential task. The agency, after all, wraps itself in the mantle of 
“the investor’s advocate,” and its political support is inextricably con-
nected to its regulation of those public markets. If the public markets 
ceased to exist, Congress would have little interest in funding the agency. 
From another perspective, however, these provisions of the JOBS 
Act are far from revolutionary. Congress raised the number of investors 
for triggering public-company status, but left intact the basic architecture 
of the securities markets—both primary and secondary—as reflected in 
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
Raising the threshold for filing under the Exchange Act does not chal-
lenge the notion that there should be a numerical dividing line between 
public and private; it simply reflects a policy disagreement between the 
SEC and Congress over where that line should be drawn. 
Where does the private–public dividing line stand after the enact-
ment of the JOBS Act? Overall, the JOBS Act gives private companies 
more latitude to remain private and eases the initial cost of transitioning 
to public status. Under the Exchange Act, the JOBS Act raises the 
threshold for triggering public-company status. For companies that 
choose to seek public status, the periodic disclosures required for the first 
five years should be less expensive without the requirement of auditor 
certification of internal controls. For the Securities Act, the JOBS Act 
makes it easier to raise capital while staying private by opening the pri-
vate placement process by permitting general solicitations. Finally, and 
potentially the most radical change, the SEC’s new authority to exempt 
offerings up to $50 million carries the intriguing possibility that the SEC 
will create a junior-varsity level of public companies. 
At this point, the creation of a public-company incubation pool is 
only a possibility, as it is easy to see the SEC dragging its heels in im-
plementing this exemption, and Congress has not mandated a date for its 
adoption. Certainly nothing will happen at the SEC anytime soon. The 
agency is still struggling to get out from under a rulemaking backlog cre-
                                                                  
 57. Id. § 401(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(D). 
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ated by the Dodd-Frank Act. After the 2012 election, perhaps with a less 
glaring spotlight from Capitol Hill,58 the SEC may feel that it has a freer 
hand in imposing substantial requirements on the exemption that it will 
eventually promulgate. If it does so, the SEC may strangle the JOBS Act 
offering exemption in its crib. 
III. MEDIATING THE TRANSITION FROM PRIVATE TO PUBLIC 
Milton Cohen’s central insight was that the disclosure needs of in-
vestors were the same in the primary and secondary markets for securi-
ties.59 Since Cohen wrote his article in the mid-1960s, the acceptance of 
the “efficient capital market hypothesis” by both regulators and courts 
has reinforced his insight. Cohen’s argument was simply the common-
sense notion that disclosure obligations should be made consistent for the 
two markets. The implication of the efficient capital market hypothesis, 
however, is that disclosure particular to securities offerings might be 
largely redundant. If the market has the information prior to the issue of 
the securities, investors already have the tools that they need to assess the 
value of the new issue. Moreover, retail investors can free ride on the 
efforts of institutional investors when purchasing if they are all partici-
pating in the same market, buying from the same fungible pool of securi-
ties. If the efficient capital market hypothesis captures the reality of pub-
lic offerings, the pricing decisions of the institutional investors will de-
termine the market price, thereby providing some assurance that retail 
investors are getting a fair deal. 
More fundamentally, with the advent of the efficient capital market 
hypothesis and its acceptance by the SEC, the regulatory focus of the 
Exchange Act has shifted. Although the Exchange Act may have been 
originally about investor protection, the development of the efficient cap-
ital market hypothesis has pushed the goal of the Exchange Act toward 
accurate pricing.60 Investor protection is simply a happy byproduct of 
efficient pricing. If markets are fully informed, the theory goes, risks will 
be accurately priced. If the goal is accuracy, rather than paternalism, re-
flecting risks in the market price is good enough. Unfortunately, there are 
substantial reasons to doubt the efficiency of the market for IPOs. 
                                                                  
 58. See Mary L. Schapiro, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony Concerning the “JOBS Act 
in Action Part II: Overseeing Effective Implementation of the JOBS Act at the SEC,” SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N (June 28, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2012/ts062812mls.htm (announcing 
that the SEC would not meet deadlines imposed in the JOBS Act). 
 59. See Cohen, supra note 1. 
 60. Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not 
Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1415 (1999). 
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A. IPOs: Bad Deals 
The shift in the focus of the Exchange Act toward accuracy has im-
plications for the transition from private to public. Faith in the power of 
efficient capital markets to protect investors rests, however, on the effi-
ciency of the underlying market. The comfort to both accurate pricing 
and investor protection provided by the efficient capital markets hypoth-
esis falls apart with the IPO. No one believes that IPOs reflect an effi-
cient capital market. In fact, the evidence is fairly strong that IPOs are 
inefficient. IPOs are bad deals. The puzzle is why IPOs persist, despite 
that inefficiency. 
IPOs are bad for companies, bad for insiders, and bad for retail in-
vestors. The few parties that do clearly benefit from these deals are the 
individuals who service them: accountants, lawyers, and underwriters. 
Underwriters, who take a standard commission of 7% of the offering in 
the overwhelming majority of IPOs, certainly reap a substantial gain 
from IPOs.61 In economic jargon, these professionals are termed “trans-
actions costs.” Although not intended as a compliment, the term is un-
doubtedly less tendentious than “blood-sucking parasite,” which is the 
term that more than one entrepreneur might use, pained by giving away 
such a substantial slice of their growing business to a mere salesman.62 
It is possible, however, that underwriters are paid for more than 
simply marketing the offering. Underwriters typically provide market-
making services for IPO companies to support the secondary market fol-
lowing the IPO. This commitment is not a contractual obligation, but 
instead is a customary understanding. If the market-making, standing 
alone, is not profitable for broker-dealers, then the underwriter’s discount 
may be, in part, compensation for those efforts. 
Why are IPOs bad for companies? Apart from the substantial sums 
paid to the blood-sucking parasites, IPOs suffer from the well-known 
phenomenon of underpricing. Underpricing is the tendency for the price 
of stocks to rise significantly above the offering price on the first day of 
                                                                  
 61. Hsuan-Chi Chen & Jay R. Ritter, The Seven-Percent Solution, 55 J. FIN. 1105, 1105 (2000) 
(finding that underwriters invariably charge a 7% commission for IPOs between $20 million and $80 
million). 
 62. To be fair to the blood-sucking parasites, the price of the offering may be much smaller if 
the company is only selling a small percentage of its shares—say 10%—as is typical. The fact that 
companies sell only a small percentage, however, only reinforces the inefficiency of IPOs. If the 
terms were better, companies would presumably sell a greater percentage. Under the current regime, 
IPOs are generally a prelude to a more substantial seasoned offering. 
1014 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:999 
secondary-market trading.63 From the perspective of the issuer, the gap 
between the secondary-market price and the offering price reflects unex-
ploited market demand for the company’s shares. The explanations of-
fered for underpricing are varied, including insurance against the risk of 
liability64 and compensation to institutional investors for the cost of col-
lecting information about the issuer.65 Another theory is that underpric-
ing encourages institutional owners to retain the shares at least until the 
lock-up period expires, typically six months after the offering, when the 
insiders will be free to sell their shares. 
These factors may play a role, but there is also the intriguing possi-
bility that the run-up in the secondary market reflects speculative frenzy 
among retail investors. This speculative frenzy cannot be captured by the 
issuer because the run-up is driven, at least in part, by the run-up itself—
momentum trading on steroids, if you will. The role of speculation ap-
pears to be part of the story of why book-built offerings continue to dom-
inate auctions as a means of selling securities.66 According to this ac-
count, auctions have failed to attract a market following because they 
offer no way of excluding the “dumb money.”67 If retail investors are 
allowed to dominate the pricing of shares, institutional investors, wary of 
the “winner’s curse,” will avoid the offering. If institutional investors 
refuse to participate, the prospects for a complete unraveling become all 
too real. Underpricing is simply the byproduct of the need to exclude the 
undesirables from the initial pricing process. Once the “dumb money” 
piles into the secondary market, all bets are off. 
Whatever the cause of underpricing, companies accept it as the cost 
of entry into the public markets. IPOs are less capital raisers than they 
                                                                  
 63. Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, 57 J. FIN. 
1795, 1797 tbl.1 (2002) (finding that between 1980 and 2001, IPOs were underpriced by 22% on 
average); see Roger G. Ibbotson & Jeffrey F. Jaffe, “Hot Issue” Markets, 30 J. FIN. 1027 (1975); Jay 
R. Ritter, The “Hot Issue” Market of 1980, 57 J. BUS. 215 (1984); see also Judith S. Ruud, Under-
writer Price Support and the IPO Underpricing Puzzle, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 135 (1993). 
 64. See, e.g., Philip D. Drake & Michael R. Vetsuypens, IPO Underpricing and Insurance 
Against Legal Liability, 22 FIN. MGMT. 64 (1993); Seha M. Tinic, Anatomy of Initial Public Offer-
ings of Common Stock, 43 J. FIN. 789 (1988). But see Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoid-
ance Theory of Why Initial Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17 (1993). 
 65. Ravi Jagannathan & Ann E. Sherman, Reforming the Bookbuilding Process for IPOs, 17 J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 67, 67 (2005). 
 66. Ravi Jagannathan et al., Why Don’t Issuers Choose IPO Auctions? The Complexity of Indi-
rect Mechanisms (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16214, 2010). 
 67. William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. 
FIN. 8, 20 (1961) (“[W]here there is much variation in the state of information or the generally ex-
pected intensity of desire of the various players for the object, or where the bidders are insufficiently 
sophisticated to discern the equilibrium point strategy . . . the Dutch auction is likely to prove rela-
tively inefficient . . . .”). 
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are debutante balls. Like wearing a fabulous gown to a ball, newly public 
companies jostle for a bump in first-day trading in order to be noticed 
and attract trading volume. The media treat a sharp rise in the after-
market price as a reflection of the offer’s “success,” often ignoring the 
money the issuer has left on the table during the book-building process. 
Why are IPOs bad for insiders? Primarily because insiders suffer 
substantial dilution of their interests in the company as a result of the 
IPO. This helps explain why IPOs are generally limited to a small per-
centage of the company’s equity. For companies with the best prospects, 
the information asymmetry between the insiders and outside investors 
means that investors are likely to substantially discount the amount they 
are willing to pay for the company’s shares. That discounting will be 
mitigated, but not eliminated, by mandatory and voluntary disclosures. 
Antifraud enforcement operates substantially below 100% accuracy, 
meaning some stretching of the truth will slip through unsanctioned. 
Moreover, complete disclosure is a practical impossibility even for com-
panies anxious to be forthcoming. Worse yet, disclosure will sometimes 
be bad for business, as it conveys useful information to a firm’s competi-
tors. 68  Given these limitations on disclosure, companies with below-
average prospects will be able to hide themselves in the pool of all IPO 
firms. The inclusion of “bad” firms in the IPO pool means that better-
than-average firms will suffer from discounting—a partial lemons ef-
fect.69 Notwithstanding these dilution costs, the benefit to insiders is that 
they will eventually enjoy a liquid market for their shares after the lock-
up expires. For some companies, the costs are worth it. Other companies 
choose to stay private. 
Why are IPOs bad for retail investors? Despite the underpricing that 
manifests itself in the secondary market on the day that the company 
goes public, the long-term performance of IPO stocks trails the risk-
adjusted returns available from holding the market portfolio.70 Given that 
this underperformance is both long-standing and well documented, why 
do investors continue to invest in IPOs? One answer is that they are lured 
into foolish purchases by crafty Wall Street salespeople. It is a Wall 
                                                                  
 68. See Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements on Public 
Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123, 151 (2004) (noting greater disclosure in private deals rela-
tive to disclosures made by public companies). 
 69. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mech-
anism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
 70. Jonathan A. Shayne & Larry D. Soderquist, Inefficiency in the Market for Initial Public 
Offerings, 48 VAND. L. REV. 965, 970 (1995); Terzah Ewing, Burnt Offerings? Street Debuts Are 
Fizzling After Pop, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2000, at C1. 
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Street truism that “new issues are sold, not bought.”71 This proposition is 
somewhat difficult to square with the prevalence of institutional inves-
tors among the lucky recipients in IPO allocations.72 But those institu-
tional investors may be counting on the ability to flip the shares to retail 
investors in the secondary market.73 Lurking in the background here, es-
pecially when combined with the underpricing phenomenon, is the worry 
that secondary-market prices may be driven by a lottery mentality, at 
least in the near term. In other words, the institutional investors who re-
ceive allocations in the IPO expect to make a profit due to the initial un-
derpricing. The retail investors who purchase their shares in the second-
ary market, however, are prone to irrational exuberance. Retail investors 
may be willing to tolerate market-lagging returns overall in exchange for 
the possibility that one of their purchases may turn out to be the next Ap-
ple or Microsoft. This lottery-ticket mentality is not likely to lead to ac-
curate pricing of a company’s future cash flows.74 
B. Facebook Again 
Facebook’s eventual IPO provided a high profile example of how 
IPOs can go badly wrong. Running contrary to the typical pattern of un-
derpricing in IPOs, Facebook’s secondary-market price quickly took a 
steep plunge, dropping in its first week of trading from the $38 offer 
price to less than $32.75 Within a few months, the price dropped below 
$20.76 Not surprisingly, a good deal of finger pointing followed. A varie-
ty of factors were identified as the culprit, the most straightforward being 
the company’s decision to issue 25% more shares than originally con-
                                                                  
 71. Louis Lowenstein, Shareholder Voting Rights: A Response to SEC Rule 19c-4 and to Pro-
fessor Gilson, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 998 (1989). 
 72. See Reena Aggarwal et al., Institutional Allocation in Initial Public Offerings: Empirical 
Evidence, 57 J. FIN. 1421, 1422 (2002) (finding that institutional investors receive approximately 
75% of original IPO shares in an average offering). 
 73. See Douglas O. Cook et al., On the Marketing of IPOs, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 35 (2006). 
 74. Bill George, The Long-Term Value of Internet Companies, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 
3, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/the-long-term-value-of-internet-companies/ 
(“[S]peculative traders looking for outsize returns can increase the volatility of company valua-
tions.”). 
 75. Michael J. De La Merced, Evelyn M. Rusli & Susanne Craig, As Facebook’s Stock Strug-
gles, Fingers Start Pointing, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 21, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2012/05/21/as-facebooks-stock-struggles-fingers-start-pointing/. 
 76. Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Man Behind Facebook’s I.P.O. Debacle, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK 
(Sept. 3, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/03/david-ebersman-the-man-behind-
facebook%E2%80%99s-i-p-o-debacle/. 
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templated.77 Undoubtedly, that decision played a part in the unusually 
large allocation of shares to retail investors in the offering.78 That influx 
of “dumb money” gave rise to the specter of the “winner’s curse.”79 
Morgan Stanley, Facebook’s underwriter, was faulted for its aggressive 
pricing of the stock.80 NASDAQ, the exchange where Facebook listed its 
shares, had a technological meltdown that caused a substantial number of 
orders to apparently disappear into the ether on the first day of trading.81 
Most damning, however, was the revelation that analysts at a number of 
banks, including Morgan Stanley, had revised downward their earnings 
projections for Facebook based on difficulties the company had disclosed 
with making money off of users who accessed Facebook through mobile 
devices. Analysts’ revised estimates were shared with the banks’ institu-
tional clients, but not with retail investors.82 Those lowered projections 
no doubt fueled the interest of those institutional investors in flipping 
their shares to retail investors as quickly as possible after the IPO. Law-
suits quickly followed,83 and Congress called hearings to examine the 
IPO process generally.84 
C. Why Do IPOs Persist? 
If IPOs are such bad deals, why do they persist? Under the current 
regime, IPOs are a practical necessity. But from the perspective of effi-
cient capital allocation, IPOs have little to commend them. The common 
                                                                  
 77. Joe Nocera, Facebook’s Brilliant Disaster, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2012), http://www.ny 
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 78. See Jacob Bunge, Aaron Lucchetti & Gina Chon, Investors Pummel Facebook – Stock 
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 80. De La Merced, Rusli & Craig, supra note 75. 
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 82. Evelyn M. Rusli, Ben Protess & Michael J. De La Merced, Questions of Fair Play Arise in 
Facebook’s I.P.O. Process, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 23, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
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theme running through the problems with IPOs for companies, insiders, 
and investors is information asymmetry. Investors are not fully informed, 
and it is costly to provide them with credible information. Speculation 
and irrational exuberance, fueled by Wall Street marketing and media 
attention, grease the wheels for deals that would not otherwise be attrac-
tive. The raison d’etre of IPOs seems to be the fact that they are the en-
trée to the big leagues of public-company status. From the perspective of 
both capital formation and investor protection, IPOs are a failure. We see 
similarly poor results for reverse mergers and private investments in pub-
lic equities (PIPEs), which are alternative—and somewhat dimly lit—
avenues for reaching the ultimate goal of public-company status.85 Like 
IPOs, these transactions share the expectation that the issued shares will 
be dumped on public investors after a holding period, perhaps accompa-
nied by aggressive selling efforts. The transition from private to public 
seems to be a rocky road, whatever the route taken. 
In the next section, I outline an alternative to the IPO designed to 
deal with the problem of inefficiency created by information asymmetry. 
I argue that my alternative is superior to the existing regime, both from 
the perspective of efficient capital allocation and the protection of retail 
investors. 
IV. A TWO-TIER ALTERNATIVE 
The public–private dividing line is on shaky ground. Congress has 
pushed back the public line for the Exchange Act with the JOBS Act. For 
the Securities Act, the SEC’s adoption of the effective equivalent of 
company registration for established companies suggests a loss of faith in 
the gun-jumping rules. At least for seasoned offerings by the largest pub-
lic issuers, the SEC no longer believes that the gun-jumping rules are 
needed to quell speculation. Congress is unlikely to lead a revival; the 
JOBS Act reflects a further erosion of the gun-jumping rules for IPO is-
suers. Congress’s endorsement of testing the waters in the JOBS Act 
sends us further along the road toward complete abolition of the gun-
jumping rules. This trend appeals to the economically minded. If we 
have full disclosure, the technology to distribute that information, and an 
informationally efficient market, do we need the gun-jumping rules of § 
5? The gun-jumping rules linger on for IPOs in a diluted form after the 
JOBS Act. And yet we saw in the last section that the gun-jumping rules 
leave much to be desired if the goal is efficient capital formation. The 
rules fall far short of achieving that goal in IPOs, incapable of overcom-
                                                                  
 85. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert S. Thompson, Redrawing the Public-Private Bounda-
ries in Entrepreneurial Capital-Raising, 97 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
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ing the fundamental inefficiency of those markets. The only possible re-
maining justification for the gun-jumping rules, if any, is investor protec-
tion. And even there, the empirical evidence suggests that the rules are of 
dubious utility. The inefficiency of the IPO market persists despite the 
daunting array of legal restrictions. 
This shift by Congress in the JOBS Act and the SEC—with its vir-
tual adoption of company registration—raises a number of questions for 
the dividing line between private and public. In this section, I propose an 
alternative to the current dividing line. What if all public offerings were 
seasoned offerings? Seasoned offerings come with a price informed both 
by full disclosure and a preexisting trading market. Could we achieve 
more efficient capital formation and better investor protection simultane-
ously? Would retail investors be harmed if we eliminated IPOs? 
My proposal is inspired by a simple sporting analogy: the English 
Premier League. The Premier League has twenty teams. At the end of 
each season, the three worst teams are relegated to the Football League 
Championship, while the top three teams from that division are promot-
ed. My proposal is for a “Premier League” for public companies and a 
lower tier for private companies, with distinct primary and secondary 
markets for each. 
Under my proposal, companies could move up and down between 
the markets as warranted. The number of companies in the public market 
would not be limited, however, as teams are in the Premier League. Any 
company reaching a certain quantitative bench mark—say $75 million in 
market capitalization, a threshold currently used by the SEC for shelf 
registration86—would be eligible for elevation to the public market.87 
Issuers would be able to choose their status; companies would not be 
dragged into the top tier against their will. Once a company opted for 
public status, however, the company would be obliged to satisfy the pe-
riodic reporting obligations of the Exchange Act for as long as they re-
mained public. Relegation to the lower tier would be subject to a share-
holder vote. The following section develops how I anticipate the process 
might work. 
A. The Private Market 
Issuers below the quantitative benchmark would be limited in their 
access to both the primary and secondary markets. Their securities could 
be sold only to accredited investors, pursuant to the standards under 
                                                                  
 86. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(1)(x) (2012). 
 87. I use market capitalization here simply for ease of exposition. The quantitative benchmark 
might alternatively be based on trading volume. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note *. 
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Regulation D88 or § 4(a)(2).89 In contrast to current practice, those securi-
ties could not be freely resold after a minimum holding period.90 Instead, 
the issuer would be required to limit transfer of those shares to accredited 
investors prior to becoming a public company.91 Among accredited in-
vestors, however, the securities could be resold without jeopardizing the 
issuer’s exemption. 
I anticipate organized markets for private trading along the lines of 
SecondMarket and SharesPost. The advent of these markets makes my 
proposal feasible. The proposal here takes advantage of those develop-
ments, but it also builds off the success of the Rule 144A market. This 
market is currently limited to Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIBs), 
which are institutional investors with more than $100 million under man-
agement.92 The proposal here would extend that existing market for QIBs 
by including accredited investors. The QIB market is estimated by indus-
try sources to have over 14,000 participants; the number of accredited 
investors surely dwarfs that by several orders of magnitude. The success 
of that QIB market suggests that the private market proposed here would 
have enough liquidity to function effectively. 
These private markets would need the issuer’s consent for the trad-
ing of their shares, thereby creating a form of quasi-listing. The private-
trading market would be responsible for screening prospective investors 
to ensure that they met the SEC’s criteria for accredited investors. Only 
certified accredited investors would be allowed to participate. This cate-
gory includes mutual funds, so retail investors could access this private 
market. They could do so, however, only through a diversified vehicle 
administered by an investment manager, who would be subject to the 
usual array of regulations. 
The question of disclosure in this market poses a challenging issue. 
It would defeat the market’s purpose to require the disclosure expected 
of a public company. On the other hand, some standardization of disclo-
sure practices would likely benefit both investors and issuers. The size of 
today’s private offerings also raises the possibility of a collective-action 
problem for investors, thereby making it difficult for them to negotiate 
                                                                  
 88. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.500–08. 
 89. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012). 
 90. That period is currently one year for non-public companies. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (2012). 
 91. See Choi, supra note 7, at 608 (“[A] true company registration system would similarly 
restrict the trading of securities of lightly followed companies with little public information regard-
less of the path the securities took to market.”). 
 92. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a) (2012). 
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for contractual representations and warranties.93 There are some funda-
mentals hard to imagine doing without, such as audited financial state-
ments. Beyond that baseline, however, is a range of difficult questions 
regarding materiality. 
One possibility would be to allow private markets to establish dis-
closure requirements pursuant to their listing agreements, and those list-
ing agreements would be subject to SEC approval.94 Such an arrange-
ment would allow for some flexibility and responsiveness to market 
forces while still ensuring that disclosure did not fall below some desired 
minimum. The SEC could perhaps implement regulatory oversight 
through an exemption for the trading venues from exchange status by 
imposing conditions on the exemption. Alternatively, the SEC could rely 
on its new § 3(b) exemption authority.95 The SEC could impose periodic 
disclosure requirements on companies relying on the § 3(b) exemption to 
sell shares to retail investors. Companies that limited their sales to ac-
credited investors and restricted the transfer of those shares only to other 
accredited investors could be exempted from those disclosure require-
ments. 
B. The Public Market 
Elevation to the public market would be voluntary. Issuers that 
were not prepared to handle the burden of public-company obligations 
could limit the transfer of their shares to the private market, which would 
be accessible only by accredited investors. If a company felt that it could 
satisfy its capital needs in the private market, the company would be free 
to remain there. 
Companies could graduate to the public market based on market 
capitalization or trading volume for common equity. These criteria are 
similar to the Exchange Act’s proxies for active investor interest,96 but 
they are more readily measured and less vulnerable to manipulation. 
Once a company elected to become public, it would initiate the process 
                                                                  
 93. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note *, at 31 (“[I]f we have doubts about collective 
action as the number of investors grows—even assuming wealth or sophistication—the case for 
mandatory periodic disclosure strengthens. In the face of dispersion, both shareholders and potential 
investors have to glean information on their own to compensate for any lack of voluntary disclosure, 
which produces inefficient duplication of effort.”). 
 94 . Mary Kissel, So Who Needs Wall Street?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2011, at A13 
(“SecondMarket requires companies to provide ‘audited financials and risk factors’ to potential 
investors. ‘That’s not required under the SEC rules,’ [SecondMarket’s CEO] says. ‘We don’t want to 
see fraudulent companies on SecondMarket. We don’t want to see people, you know, making in-
vestment decisions without being well-informed. That’s bad for us as a marketplace.’”). 
 95. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2). 
 96. See supra text accompanying notes 19–27. 
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of transitioning to trading in the public market by first filing a Form 10-
K.97 A seasoning period would follow, with the filing of requisite 10-
Qs,98 during which the shares would continue to be traded in the private 
market.99 The prices in the private market, however, would now be in-
formed by full SEC-mandated disclosure. After the seasoning period, 
accredited investors would be able to sell their shares in the public mar-
ket. This opportunity would be available regardless of whether the ac-
credited investor purchased its shares from the company, or the shares 
were purchased from other accredited investors in the private-trading 
market. The public market could be an exchange, if the company chose 
to list, or an over-the-counter market. Either way, the trading price in the 
public market would be informed by the prior trading in the private mar-
ket, as well as the new information released in the company’s 10-K and 
10-Qs. 
The private-market seasoning period before public trading raises 
some difficult questions. It would not be practicable to limit companies 
from any sales during the seasoning period; capital needs do not go away 
simply because the company is making the transition to public status. 
Indeed, the need for capital is presumably pushing the company to bear 
the burdens of public status. This creates the possibility that companies 
could use investment banks or other intermediaries, such as hedge funds, 
as conduits during the seasoning period. The viability of this strategy is 
limited, however, by the fact that the intermediaries could only sell 
shares to other accredited investors during the seasoning period. Thus, 
the risks of an unregistered “distribution” to retail investors are low. 
Moreover, unless the company has very pressing capital needs, it is un-
likely to tolerate much of a liquidity discount for its shares, which it will 
be able to freely sell after the seasoning period expires. It might, howev-
er, be necessary to impose volume limits on sellers in the public markets 
during a transition period in order to allow the trading market to develop. 
A quick dump of shares immediately after the seasoning period expired 
has the potential to reproduce the inefficient pricing and irrational specu-
lation that taints the market for IPOs. 
Only after the company graduated to having its shares traded in the 
public market would the company be free to sell equity to public inves-
tors. What form should sales of public equity by the issuer take? The log-
                                                                  
 97. 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2012). 
 98. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (2012). 
 99. Cf. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-65708, 76 Fed. Reg. 
70799 (Nov. 8, 2011) (approving NASDAQ rule change requiring a seasoning period of a year fol-
lowing a reverse merger before a company can be listed). 
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ic of the proposal, with its preference for the superior informational effi-
ciency of trading markets, suggests that issuers selling equity should be 
limited to at-the-market (ATM) offerings. Issuers would sell directly into 
the public-trading market instead of relying on an underwriter to identify 
(or create?) demand. This approach puts its faith in markets, rather than 
salesmen, for efficient pricing. Unfortunately, this strategy has its limita-
tions. ATM offerings are a rapidly growing portion of seasoned equity 
offerings,100 but they are still dwarfed by traditional book-built offerings. 
Particularly for larger offerings, the liquidity of the secondary-trading 
market may be insufficient to absorb such a large number of shares with-
out substantially diluting existing shareholders. To be sure, book-built 
offerings would be significantly constrained by the existence of a market 
price. Is it possible to nudge issuers toward ATM offerings without man-
dating them? 
One possibility would be to eliminate § 11 and § 12(a)(2) liabil-
ity101 for at-the-market offerings, while retaining this requirement for 
underwritten offerings. At a minimum, it makes little sense to impose 
underwriter liability on the broker-dealers hired by issuers to manage 
ATM offerings. If large volumes need to be “sold, not bought,” the op-
portunities for abuse arise in the selling process. SEC and FINRA en-
forcement would be needed to ensure that there were no back-door sell-
ing efforts to prime the market for an ATM offering. Even for the issuer, 
the draconian threat of § 11’s strict liability seems excessive for an ATM 
offering. ATM offerings, if genuinely sold into a preexisting market 
without stimulation, do not require a registration statement or a prospec-
tus. At most, ATM offerings need an 8-K102 announcing the number of 
shares to be offered, followed by another 8-K disclosing the number of 
shares actually sold. Antifraud concerns could be addressed by the less 
draconian Rule 10b-5.103 
C. Relegation 
If there are private companies wanting to rise to the public level in 
my scheme, it follows that there are likely to be public companies at-
tracted to the reduced burdens of private status. An important benefit of a 
                                                                  
 100. James D. Small III, W. Clayton Johnson & Leslie N. Silverman, The Resurgence of Unit-
ed States At-The-Market Equity Offerings to Raise Capital in Volatile Equity Markets, 4 CAPITAL 
MARKETS L. J. 290, 292 (2009) (“From June 2008 through the end of April 2009, more than 25 
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 101. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11 & 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(a)(2) (2012). 
 102. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2012). 
 103. Id. § 240.10b-5. 
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two-tier market is that retail investors would not be completely cut off 
from liquidity if a company chooses to relegate itself to the private mar-
ket. There is no reason to preclude retail investors from selling their 
shares in the private market, even if they would be barred from purchas-
ing shares in companies that dropped down to private-company status. 
Moreover, there is little to be gained by prohibiting companies from exit-
ing the public pool; a restrictive approach will simply discourage compa-
nies from pursuing public-company status in the first place. On the other 
hand, too lenient an approach may put too much stress on the fiduciary 
duties of directors under state law to prevent abuses. Are there proce-
dures available that can limit the opportunities for abuse? 
I propose that a shareholder vote be required before a company 
would be permitted to drop from public to private status.104 A vote, with 
the usual disclosures required by the federal proxy rules, would be a use-
ful check on private-to-public-to-private manipulation schemes. It would 
not trap companies, however, that have struggled after going public. The 
company would have to make its case to its shareholders that the benefits 
of public-company status were no longer worth the candle. Who should 
be eligible to participate in the voting? It seems prudent to exclude the 
votes of insiders and controlling shareholders, but should we also steri-
lize the votes of institutional investors? My instinct is that this additional 
restriction would not be necessary. The loss of liquidity attendant to rele-
gation to the private market affects non-controlling institutional investors 
and retail investors in the same way; their interests are aligned. Giving 
the veto threat to too narrow of a group raises the possibility of holdup. 
D. Objections 
Won’t an expanded private market open the door to fraud and ma-
nipulation? The short answer is that as long as people are infected by the 
love of money, fraud will always be with us. Given that sad fact of hu-
man nature, we should funnel transactions to the venues that make it 
most difficult to get away with fraud. To be sure, the private market pro-
posed here is likely to have a higher incidence of fraud and manipulation 
than the public market. But the scope of that fraud will necessarily be 
limited by the smaller size of the private markets relative to their public 
counterparts. Moreover, the entities sponsoring trading in those private 
markets will have competitive incentives to take cost-effective measures 
                                                                  
 104. See Jesse M. Fried, Firms Gone Dark, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 135 (2009) (advocating that a 
shareholder vote be required before a firm could cease periodic disclosures). 
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to discourage fraud.105 And the SEC and FINRA enforcement would be 
available to counter the most egregious abuses. 
The potential for abuse in the private market has to be weighed 
against reductions in fraud elsewhere. In particular, my proposed season-
ing-period requirement substantially reduces the opportunities for fraud 
by companies entering the public market. On balance, the overall inci-
dence of fraud may well be reduced. Furthermore, retail investors, who 
are least able to bear it, will almost certainly be exposed to less fraud. At 
the same time, capital formation—efficient allocation of capital to cost-
justified projects—will be enhanced. 
Another potential objection is that liquidity will suffer if the role of 
underwriters is diminished. One service provided by underwriters is 
market making immediately following the offering. My proposal antici-
pates the market coming into existence prior to the public offering. Will 
broker-dealers step in to provide liquidity in the absence of underwriters? 
If market making is profitable on its own, the obvious answer is yes. But 
if market making is not profitable standing alone for smaller issuers, 
there is no reason that it has to be bundled with underwriting. If some 
issuers need to subsidize initial trading in their shares, this can be ac-
complished outside of an underwriting relationship through a direct 
payment. 
Finally, objectors to my proposal should be careful to avoid the nir-
vana fallacy. The alternative to my two-tier proposal is not the tight regu-
lation of registered offerings that we saw for much of the Securities Act’s 
history; it is the public-company-“lite” status of offerings exempted un-
der the new § 3(b) of the JOBS Act.106 Is that public-company incubator 
pool really superior from the perspective of investor protection? 
V. CONCLUSION 
What if we simply focused on capital formation in drawing the line 
between private and public markets? A focus on capital formation sug-
gests that we should put an end to IPOs if we can establish a viable alter-
native. In my view, restrictions on private markets have hindered that 
viable alternative from emerging. The JOBS Act’s increase to 2,000 
shareholders for public-company status is a big step toward a greater role 
for private markets. My proposed alternative to the current IPO regime 
would bring the company-registration initiative to its logical conclusion. 
Private companies would be required to go through a seasoning period—
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with mandatory disclosure—before selling securities to the public. This 
seasoning period would mark the line between private and public, rather 
than the current standards of exchange listing, number of shareholders, or 
the filing of a registration statement for an initial public offering. 
The foundation of my proposal rests on two central premises: (1) 
IPOs are an inefficient means of capital formation; and (2) private mar-
kets, with pools of liquidity that are continuing to expand, will be suffi-
cient to satisfy the capital needs of growing companies until they are 
ready for the burdens that come with public-company status. The evi-
dence for the first proposition is consistent and strong. The second prop-
osition blazes a path into still uncharted territory. The Rule 144A QIB 
market and the rise of private markets like SecondMarket and SharesPost 
show the potential of private-trading markets. Until the passage of the 
JOBS Act, however, those markets have been hamstrung by the 500-
shareholder limit triggering public-company status. Raising that limit to 
2,000 shareholders of record promises to substantially increase the li-
quidity of private markets. More time will be needed, however, before 
we can assess whether this expansion of the private markets gains market 
acceptance. 
The bottom line is that with the passage of the JOBS Act, change is 
coming to the demarcation between private and public status under the 
securities laws. The looming question is whether the SEC will attempt to 
obstruct this change, or embrace it in an effort to promote greater capital 
formation. My proposal affords the SEC an opportunity to promote capi-
tal formation while also enhancing investor protection. The two-tier pri-
vate–public market scheme outlined here would complete the company-
registration model put forward by Milton Cohen nearly a half century 
ago. We should harness private markets to promote the public good. Pri-
vate markets may finally allow us to abolish initial public offerings. 
 
